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A number of things may be said in favour of a codification of private law (most of them applicable in other common law/mixed legal systems, not just the Scottish legal system).
First, it would clarify currently unclear or ambiguous legal rules, and provide precisely worded and more easily understandable law. This, of course, can be a virtue of legislative enactments in general, and it is not one which can be claimed for codification alone, albeit that the specific style of codification which I propose (see below) would involve more succinct expression of legal rules than one finds in current Common Law style legislation.
Second-and this would follow only from a more Civilian style of codification, not from a maxi-statute approach-it would reduce the overall volume of written law, producing a corpus of civil law which had the virtue of greater brevity.
The phenomenon of ever more lengthy statutes is a manifestation of a tendency to over-regulate, deriving from a systemic legislative tendency to attempt to provide for all eventualities in law. The end result is an avalanche of laws, one which restricts personal liberty and can be perceived by individuals as diminishing their overall quality of life. Codification can act as a counter-weight to over-regulation, 8 because
Codes tend both to be shorter documents and to allow for gap-filling by courts.
Third, a Code dealing with all, or most, areas of the civil law would provide a single locus for members of the public, legal practitioners, and courts to discover the law. It would thereby increase ease of access to justice, and remove difficulties legally unqualified individuals face in searching for the law. A Code cannot turn members of the public into legal experts, but it can at least furnish them with a single starting point for understanding their rights, duties, and remedies, in order to apply them to their specific circumstances. Fourth, the adoption of a Code would provide answers to some important legal issues not currently determined by the law. Scotland is a small jurisdiction, 9 one in which much of our private law is non-statutory in nature. Some basic rules of the law have yet to be fully settled by the courts (and hence generate a deal of academic disagreement), and, given that only a small number of relevant cases arise in relation to individual issues over time, the determination of the basic rules is a slow process clarity is lacking is in relation to third party rights under contract (ius quaesitum tertio): the current Scottish law rests on old authorities, some of them at odds with each other, so much so that evidence exists that Scottish law firms are recommending the use of English law (with its modern third party rights statute) as the governing law for some sorts of contractual relationships in order to avoid the confused Scots law.
11 9 The population of Scotland is approximately 5,300,000 which is roughly equivalent to that of Colorado or Minnesota in the USA, and a little less than the Australian state of Victoria. 10 Of course, at the other end of the scale, matters can be just as problematic. US Common law is drowning in new cases, and the internet has made the problem even worse. It is impossible to cite in litigation even a tenth of the potentially relevant US cases, and it might well be better for those practising law if much of the case law were not publicly available. Too much precedent can be as troublesome as too little. 11 The concerns of the legal profession are documented in a blog post by a Scottish solicitor: see D Mathie, 'Third Party Rights-Scots Law stuck in the 17 th Century' (August 2010), accessible at: http://www.brodies.com/blog/2010/08/26/third-party-rights-scots-law-stuck-in-the-17th-century/. The Scottish Law Commission is aware of the problem, and will soon be publishing a Report (including a draft Bill) on reform of this area of law. Scottish Law Commissioner, Professor Hector MacQueen, has previously written on the subject of third party rights and codification: see H MacQueen, 'Third Party Rights in Contract: A Case Study of Codifying and Not Codifying' in L Chen and C van Rhee (eds), Towards a Chinese Civil Code (Leiden, Brill, 2012) . This is a lamentable state of affairs. A healthy system of private law should have neither holes nor glaring uncertainties in it.
Fifth-and this follows from the first and fourth points-a reduction in unclear issues and the determination of uncertain issues which would follow from codification should reduce the amount of litigation, and therefore provide economic savings over time. By contrast, in the existing legal environment, private parties bear much of the economic burden of law reform, as litigants must pay for judicial determination of disputes relating to a host of uncertain or unanswered legal issues.
Sixth, a Code would reduce the amount of time wasted by academics, practitioners, and courts, in trawling through the vast number of old and often inaccessible case reports, as well as the ever increasing number of new precedents, in an attempt to discover the law 12 or, in the case of some academic publications, to build up a legal arsenal for deployment in argumentation with other academics. I am not alone in my concern that too much academic time is spent in forensic investigation of what the law is, and in writing articles which laboriously trace the correct path of legal development through nineteenth century and earlier case law.
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Such endeavours produce great scholarship, but they divert scholarly attention from matters which might otherwise usefully engage it. I have felt increasingly frustrated over the course of my own career by the amount of time I have had to spend in writing articles in which I have tried to argue that particular rules ought to be the position in Scots law, or (in my recent scholarship) that certain fundamental words used by our legal system to describe the nature of obligations should mean x or y. I gaze enviously upon other country's Civil Codes in which these matters are set out in a few lines-no hours of wasted time for academics working on those systems,
arguing repeatedly about what the position should be. The problem seems to be even more acute in fully Common law systems: so, even now, there is still a debate about 12 'There is so much information -so many undigested cases available at the click of a mouse -that the demand now is for this mass of raw information to be organised. proper separation of powers by reducing the law-making capacity of judges. We live in a democracy not a kritarchy, and codification supports democratic values.
Together, these arguments represent quite an arsenal in favour of codification.
Whether they are persuasive must rest in part upon the strength of contrary arguments.
IV. AGAINST CODIFICATION
A number of arguments may be ranged against codification. First, it can be argued that there isn't any real problem with our non-codified legal system (or at least no problem which can't be solved with the judicious use of statutes)-so, why change things? The use of piecemeal statutory development, perhaps building up over time to become (in scope) a Code, might be said to be just as practical a way of tackling some of the problems I have identified with the legal system. The Law Commission of England and Wales is essentially taking this approach with its step-by-step approach to implementation of its suggested draft Criminal Code; 16 a similar approach could be taken with the civil law. This is all true enough, though if we simply aim for a maxistatute we would not get the kind of Civil Code I have in mind: we wouldn't reduce the volume of legislation produced; we wouldn't get the general structural and overarching elements a Code offers; and we wouldn't move to the Civilian legislative and interpretative culture which a Code would usher in. Common lawyers might be very happy to hear that! But for a mixed system lawyer, these might count as losses.
Second, a problem with codification is that bad rules may be codified with which we are then stuck. Codes tend (sensibly) not to be revised very often-it took around a century to revise the BGB-so if one implements what comes to be viewed as a bad or unclear rule, that will have a long term negative effect on a legal system. Third, it is sometimes said that codification would reduce the ability of judges to 'do justice' in hard cases. The essence of this concern is that a Code might unnecessarily hamper and restrain a court, requiring it to reach an unjust conclusion in the circumstances of a case because such circumstances had not been considered during the drafting of the applicable rule(s). This is a danger which, in order to be mitigated, would require a combination of the right degree of abstraction of the rules combined with a power given to the judiciary to gap-fill as necessary (this is discussed further at section G below). The danger could not be completely avoided, however, and any recurring problems would require amendment of the Code. Fifth, it could be said that codification (in the full Civilian sense) is not part of our legal culture-adopting it would thus represent Civilian imperialism, distorting the nature of our legal system and failing to respect our indigenous and complex legal culture. This criticism bites more in a purely Common law context, less so in a mixed legal one; however, it is true that codification would represent a dramatic reduction in the Common law element of the mixed system of Scots law, and hence represent a significant legal cultural shift away from the Common law tradition. 17 This is a significant concern, and in order for it to be over-ridden one would need a clear sense that the benefits of a Civilian form of codification were manifest and weighty. 17 An observation I think justified by the more obviously Civilian feel of legal systems such as Louisiana, Quebec, and Israel.
In order to explore this last point of legal culture more fully, it will be helpful to undertake a brief examination of the legal culture of Scotland from the perspective of past and present codifying tendencies.
V. CODIFICATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE MIXED LEGAL

SYSTEM OF SCOTLAND
I began this chapter with a reference to the 'mixed' nature of the Scottish legal system. Much has been written about this, and it is to simplify matters to note only the and would not be without cultural ramifications: as the historian John Davies has remarked, "[i]n Scotland, the indigenous law was (and is) the corner-stone of the principle of the common citizenship of the entire population". 35 In any event, the likelihood of the DCFR acting as the basis for a pan-European civil code now looks slim (a more limited instrument, harmonising online sales law and perhaps digital content, being a little more likely); if codification is to occur, it is likely to be at the Scottish rather than the European level.
Overall, I think it is fair to say that the Scottish legal tradition is one which has been, and continues to be, more accommodating towards the potential codification of the civil law. Our law has been historically influenced by Roman law, which in the Justinianic period was codified; modern Scots lawyers continue to demonstrate a fondness for principles of law (of varying degrees of abstraction) capable of being encapsulated within Codes; and legal scholars have taken the view that accommodating Scots law within a wider European harmonisation and perhaps codification would not be as challenging as it would for English law, given the existing civilian elements in much of our private law.
VI. WHAT MIGHT A SCOTTISH CIVIL CODE LOOK LIKE?
What I would place Clive's Part 6-Rights and Obligations in general-earlier: one needs to know these rules before addressing family law, given that it imposes duties on family members and in so doing gives other family members rights. I would have a separate part on (unilateral) promise, which is after all a distinct obligation in Scots 36 The sort of language I analyse in my forthcoming It seems then that, at present, the Scottish Nationalist administration, having other legislative priorities, 52 is no more receptive to the idea of codification than Clive found the Labour-Liberal coalition to be at the turn of the new millennium. Whether the Government might be prevailed upon to change its view by further lobbying seems doubtful. I suspect that wider public support would be needed to bolster any such lobbying. 50 Letter from Jill Clark of the Scottish Government's Justice Directorate, Civil Law and Legal System Division, dated 13 October 2015 (ref 2015/0031302). 51 One might speculate that this exemplifies an attitude noted by former Law Commissioner, Professor George Gretton (n 49) 132: 'Tell [politicians] that the law needs to be made simpler, more accessible and more coherent and they look bored'. 52 The result of the increased devolutionary responsibility which the new Scotland Bill, currently going through the UK Parliament, will bring to the Scottish Parliament (including increased taxation and welfare powers and responsibility) may mean less Parliamentary time for existing responsibilities, including reform of private law.
What then of any such public support? Clive's assessment was that "there is not currently a perceived need for codification … There is no demand from the general public". 53 However, even though he thought there to be no demand as such (which would seem still to be the case, if the Government's mention in its letter to me of a lack of public interest may be taken as accurate), he suspected that the public would favour codification were it to be on offer, given that the public already appeared to prefer statute to case law (a preference suggested as resting upon the relative ease of discovering the law from statutes). 54 I think that was (and remains) a fair assessment. The public does, I suspect, prefer legislation because it easier to read and because direct public access to court judgments from before the early 1990s is very difficult; there is certainly a steady stream of public petitions to the Scottish Parliament 55 asking for legislative reform of areas of the law. The public might then be brought on side, but it is challenging to see how sufficient public interest could be generated, short of either identifying a Parliamentary champion or else starting and finding support for a public petition for a Civil Code.
B. Preparatory steps and implementation
If sufficient support could be generated among the public, and in the political and legal worlds, to enable a Civil Code project to be advanced, a number of facilitative matters would require consideration.
Would public consultation form part of the process of forming the draft content of the Code? To a large extent, that would depend upon whether the plan were largely just to replicate the existing law (in which case, consultation might extend to no more than whether the idea of codification was a good one) or whether the opportunity would be taken to reform parts of the law (in which case consultation would have to be more extensive, both in scope and likely timescale). Code took about fifteen years to produce, after which the draft was rejected; a revised draft took a further eight years. In the Philippines (a mixed legal system like Scotland), a Civil Code Commission formed in 1947 led to the adoption of a Code five years later. In Scotland, given that a Civil Code would be an entirely new enterprise, it is hard to envisage the task taking less than ten years to complete. Being more precise than that is difficult: the time to be taken for debates over policies and over potential drafting difficulties are two variables which it is hard to assess. I can conceive of the possibility of the Code being brought into effect in stages, though that would be a less preferable route: staged implementation would make it more difficult, though not impossible, to include cross-referencing between parts of the Code (e.g.
between the obligations and property parts) given that any such cross-referencing might be to parts of the Code which would not yet be in effect. Other systems have codified piece by piece, 58 or revised in such a manner, so I wouldn't wish to write off such an idea for my own system, but given the Civilian drafting and interpretative methodology I propose, any staged implementation ought not simply to be a succession of maxi-statutes in the traditional Common law mould.
Once a Code were adopted, any subsequent reform would also take some time: Scottish Civil Code would not have to occur for some considerable time. This would be dependent on legislators resisting the urge to tinker with the Code in the way that they tend to tinker with ordinary statutes and subordinate legislation, something that would require a cultural shift on the part of legislators, and a supreme effort to ensure that the text of the Code as adopted had been fully considered and carefully drafted.
Inevitably, there might be periodic minor amendments to implement any changes necessitated by EU Directives.
As to likely costs associated with the CCC, I think we can envisage costs in would not simply be a very long statute. Careful thought would have to be given to the level of abstraction of the provisions of the Code; the existing British style of statutory drafting, which is to be as comprehensive as possible once the scope of the intended provision has been determined, would be inappropriate. Some existing Codes approach certain questions at (to my mind) too high a level of abstraction: one example with which I suspect others will agree is the very truncated section on delict in the French Civil Code, a mere five articles. The consequence is that much has had to be left to the courts to work out, including matters that really should have been in the Code itself.
(b) A change in interpretative culture. It has been said that in Civil Law countries, the "rules of construction allow for more interpretative flexibility", the canon of construction comprising "the literal (or grammatical) interpretation, the systematic (or systematic-logical interpretation), the historical interpretation, and the objective-teleological interpretation". 61 Judges steeped in the Common Law tradition of interpreting statutes would require to undergo a change in mind-set if such a broader approach were to be adopted in relation to a Scottish Civil Code.
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The challenge of achieving this change of mind-set should not be underestimated: Admittedly, however, in any likely drive for codification in fully Common law systems it is almost unthinkable that the type of codification proposed would involve 64 Though, over a five to ten year drafting period, one cannot discount a change of policy view in a legislature. 65 Clive suggested this as a serious possibility: (n 53) 418. 
VIII. WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN TO THE DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENT?
The use of case law to explain and develop the law has its proponents and opponents.
Opponents argue that justice is not well served by sometimes hard to find, old, and occasionally badly decided, case law; proponents laud the flexibility that careful, Common (and Civilian) law which has been so important in the development of the jurisprudence of a small legal system like Scotland.
IX. COMPARATIVE CODIFIED MODELS
In drafting a civil code, a CCC would of course have a wealth of comparative civil codes on which to draw when considering the structure, style, and content of any To what extent a CCC might want to produce a draft instrument which, in modelling itself more on the content of the PECL and DCFR, would further 'civilianise' Scots private law is an interesting question. It is one which would raise a number of considerations, among them the proposed timescale for completing the project: greater adoption of PICC, PECL or DCFR rules would greatly increase the need for consultation and the burden of the preparatory work of the CCC.
X. CONCLUSIONS
By way of conclusions, let me make a few remarks under three headings relating to the kind of codification I have been considering: desirability; practicability; and attainability.
In terms of desirability, I have argued that codification within the Civilian tradition is, on the whole, a desirable thing for the small, mixed legal system of Scotland. A number of benefits would accrue, among them clarification of currently confused areas of the law; the filling in of gaps in our existing jurisprudence; and reversal of the current trend to over-regulation and legislation. Ultimately, the most convincing argument for codification in all currently un-codified legal systems, including Scotland, is a legal-political one: codification would bring the law closer to the public, making it more accessible and encouraging a greater sense of individual participation in the legal order. So, the heart of my argument rests on a justification which is not merely a legal but also a politico-governmental one.
In terms of practicability, I have argued that the task of codification of the civil law could be achieved in the medium term, assuming the necessary support from both the legal and political spheres. Completion of the project would come with a reasonably substantial price tag, but the positive results would have an enduring economic value. There would be policy and drafting challenges, but no more so than in other systems which have codified their law, and the drafting Commission could draw on the comparative codification experience of other legal systems. The adjustment of legal culture which would require to follow the style of drafting I have proposed, and the shift to a system of jurisprudence constante, would present the greatest challenges, but it should not be forgotten that we already live with a history of quite dramatic changes in legislative drafting style, and that we did not have a system of stare decisis before the emergence of accessible, printed law reports.
Finally, in terms of attainability, it must be admitted that there is an absence of any interest in a codification project in the present Scottish Government, that views in the legal community are mixed, and that it is not a subject which puts fire into the bellies of the public. But at a time of growing nationalism in Scotland, it is not inconceivable that the current party of Government in Scotland might come to see in the project a means to celebrate and bolster national identity and legal culture. If
Scottish independence were to be achieved in any future independence referendum, I
suspect there would be a greater likelihood of codification of both the civil and criminal law. That is not to say that it is a project which unionists cannot also get behind: support or opposition for codification does not follow political lines.
Of course, national codification of private law is not the only way to improve a legal system. As discussed in this chapter, alternatives include greater European harmonisation or codification, national restatement, consolidation of existing statutory law, continued use of maxi-statutes, and step-by-step legislative development of areas of law which could, over time, develop into a sort of "code". The realist (perhaps pessimist?) in me suspects that conservative inertia and more pressing governmental priorities will result only in the continuing use of maxi-statutes; that, at best, step-bystep codification (in a traditional British sense) will continue to be the means of ongoing reform of Scots law; and that the likelihood of a more sweeping codification of private law will remain (in the short term) slim. 80 Yet the dreamer in me wants to believe that something more is possible, and that a codification of private law which offers easy public access to concisely expressed, comprehensive legislative provisions, resting on a Scottish preference for clear legal principle and structures, ought to be the aspiration of our legal system. 
